Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Thought and Reality' and 'Reals by Abstraction'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


58 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett]
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]